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Morgan’s Canon has been touted as “the most awesome weapon in animal psychology,” (Wynne
and Udell, 2013, p. 14). The enemies that this century-old principle is usually employed to destroy
are explanations of behavior that potentially exaggerate the cognitive capacities of nonhumans.
Often, the battle is between explanations based on associative learning and explanations that invoke
other “more sophisticated” psychological processes (Shettleworth, 2010; Heyes, 2012; Smith et al.,
2012), where more sophisticated typically means evident in adult humans. Given the longevity and
apparently foundational importance of Morgan’s Canon, some comparative psychologists might
be surprised to learn that philosophers have recently argued that this principle is illegitimate as a
basis for choosing between competing explanations of animal behavior (Fitzpatrick, 2008; Heyes,
2012; Buckner, 2013; Starzak, 2016). Starzak (2016), in particular, suggests that Morgan’s Canon
should be jettisoned in favor of more general scientific principles shared by all disciplines. This
commentary considers the merit of Starzak’s argument against Morgan’s Canon.
Morgan’s (1903, p. 59) Canon states, “In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of
higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower
in the scale of psychological evolution and development.” Historically, this statement has been
interpreted in disparate ways (Sober, 1998, 2005; Thomas, 1998, 2001; Allen-Hermanson, 2005;
Smith et al., 2012; Shettleworth, 2013). For instance, Morgan’s “lower” and “higher psychological
processes” have been portrayed as corresponding to simpler vs. more complex cognitive abilities,
implicit vs. explicit memory capacities, reflexive vs. volitional processes, etc. Similarly, because the
phylogenetic scale that Morgan envisioned is archaic, modern interpretations of Morgan’s Canon
often adopt alternative evolutionary continua. Shettleworth (2010, 2013), for example, describes
cognitive capacities demonstrated in many species (and therefore presumed to be phylogenetically
older) as “lower processes,” reserving the higher end of the scale for evolutionarily younger,
species-specific specializations (see also Sober, 1998, 2005; Karin-D’arcy, 2005).
The crux of Starzak’s (2016) argument against Morgan’s Canon is that regardless of which
interpretation of the principle one favors, there is no justification for assuming that explanations
emphasizing processes at one position along any particular “scale of psychological evolution and
development” are better than other explanations that emphasize processes at other positions along
that scale. By analogy, systematic rankings of human beauty vary across different cultures and
generations such that an individual may be ranked high on one scale and low on another. But,
regardless of which criteria for ranking beauty one chooses, there are no rational or empirical
grounds for claiming that all “ugly” individuals are inherently better than those judged to be
beautiful.
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Some have argued, however, that there are justifications
for preferring explanations that occupy the lower end of
psychological scales. For example, Karin-D’arcy (2005) defends
a modernized version of Morgan’s Canon by claiming that
the principle forces one to dig deeper, encourages careful
interpretation, protects from error and misjudgment, provides
a check against anthropomorphism, emphasizes the importance
of cross-species differences, prevents reliance on hastily drawn
conclusions, and promotes closer assessment of test validity.
Evidence for such claims is currently lacking and philosophers
who have considered these potential justifications of Morgan’s
Canon have found them to be weak or invalid (Fitzpatrick,
2008; Starzak, 2016). Possible upgrades to Morgan’s Canon have
been proposed (Andrews and Huss, 2014; Meketa, 2014), but
Starzak (2016) advocates only giving preference to explanations
of animals’ actions that have greater evidential support (see also
Sober, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2008; Heyes, 2012; Mikhalevich, 2015).
Unfortunately, evidence about the cognitive origins of
animals’ actions rarely justifies choosing one explanation over
another. Naturalistic observations can reveal a subset of animals’
actions that are salient to human observers, but rarely compel
inferences about any mental processes that may accompany or
enable those actions. Experimental data can reveal how some
animals fare when faced with cleverly contrived scenarios, but
are usually consistent with multiple, comparably evidenced,
interpretations regarding what subjects represent, remember,
or understand. The so-far unobservable qualities of mental
processes are exactly what make scientists skeptical of claims
about how animals cognize, and what historically have sparked
intellectual battles betweenmechanists and cognitivists.Morgan’s
Canon leads to unjustified verdicts about animals’ minds, but
empiricism gives rise to deadlocked juries.
For Starzak (2016), preference for an explanation of an
animal’s actions is justified when that explanation can be shown
to be better (e.g., greater in explanatory power or more likely to
be true). In contrast, Morgan justified his Canon by claiming that,
“The only fruitful method of procedure is the interpretation of
facts observed with due care in the light of sound psychological
principles,” (Morgan, 1903, p. 59). From Morgan’s perspective,
using sound principles to identify superior explanations enables
scientific progress. Starzak (2016) and other critics of Morgan’s
Canon appear to implicitly endorse this position by focusing
more on the soundness of candidate principles rather than
challenging the claim that such principles are necessary.
Although it might seem self-evident that interpreting facts using
sound principles is an essential component of scientific research,
historical analyses suggest that science advances despite, and in
some cases even because of, reliance on scientifically unsound
principles (Koestler, 1959; Feyerabend, 1975). For example, the
anthropomorphic, anecdotal approach adopted by Darwin and
Romanes (considered “unsound” by modern standards) helped
to instigate the experimental studies conducted by Morgan and
Thorndike, thereby sparking a revolution in psychological studies
of animals. Objectively, it is difficult to tell whether Morgan’s
Canon has catalyzed or cannibalized progress in animal cognition
research.
Despite its critics, Morgan’s Canon seems likely to maintain
its exalted status within the field of comparative cognition.
Textbooks may continue noting that there are “some concerns”
about the principle while simultaneously emphasizing its
fundamental importance. Reviewers will probably persist in
attacking interpretations that “break the rule.” Luckily for
comparative psychologists, history shows that adherence to
general methodological or theoretical principles can lead
to advances in understanding even when those principles
are specious. Nevertheless, it remains possible that slavish
adherence to this particular unsound principle could impede
future progress by systematically biasing researchers toward
underattributing cognitive capacities to nonhumans (Fitzpatrick,
2008; Mikhalevich, 2015).
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